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Restricted Prioritarianism or Competing Claims? 
Benjamin Lange 
Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford 
Abstract 
I here settle a recent dispute between two rival theories in distributive ethics: Re-
stricted Prioritarianism and the Competing Claims View. Both views mandate that the dis-
tribution of benefits and burdens between individuals should be justifiable to each 
affected party in a way that depends on the strength of each individual’s separately 
assessed claim to receive a benefit. However, they disagree about what elements 
constitute the strength of those individuals’ claims. According to restricted prioritar-
ianism, the strength of a claim is determined in ‘prioritarian’ fashion by both what 
she stands to gain and her absolute level of well-being, while, according to the 
competing claims view, the strength of a claim is also partly determined by her level 
of well-being relative to others with conflicting interests. I argue that, suitably modi-
fied, the competing claims view is more plausible than restricted prioritarianism.  
1.  Introduction 
We can distinguish between two morally significant facts.* According to what we can call the  
Unity of the Individual, an individual’s life has a unity that renders it appropriate to balance 
benefits and burdens which accrue to her for her sake (in a way that maximizes her expected 
well-being1) but inappropriate to balance benefits and burdens which accrue to her as if they 
accrued to different individuals’ lives; 2 
                                                
     * I am grateful to David Healey, Geoff Keeling, Will MacAskill, James Matharu, and an anonymous ref-
eree for feedback on earlier drafts of this paper. I am especially indebted to Mike Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve 
for extensive comments and discussion. 
     1 I will here be mainly concerned with health-related well-being. Moreover, henceforth the term ‘well-
being’ should be understood synonymously with ‘utility’, where both stand for how well an individual’s life is 
going or would go. 
     2 When speaking of the prospective gains (benefits) in well-being throughout this paper, I shall assume a 
cardinal, interpersonally comparable preference-based measure of well-being that satisfies the von Neumann-
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And according to the  
Separateness of Persons, a group of individuals’ lives have a separateness that renders it inappro-
priate to balance benefits and burdens which accrue to them as if they accrued to a single 
life.3 
Recently, two views have been proposed which register this difference: Restricted Prioritarianism, 
proposed by Andrew Williams, and the Competing Claims View, proposed by Marc Fleurbaey, 
Michael Otsuka, and Alex Voorhoeve.4  
Both views mandate that the distribution of benefits and burdens between individuals should 
be justifiable to each affected party in a way that depends on the strength of each individual’s 
separately assessed claim to receive a benefit. However, they disagree about what elements 
constitute the strength of those individuals’ claims. According to restricted prioritarianism, the 
strength of a claim is determined in ‘prioritarian’ fashion by both what she stands to gain and 
her absolute level of well-being (with a claim to a given increment in well-being being strong-
er, the lower the level from which this increment takes place), but her claim is unaffected by 
how others fare. According to the competing claims view, the strength of a claim is also partly 
determined by her level of well-being relative to others with conflicting interests.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Morgenstern axioms. This measure is based on the ‘self-interested preferences that [an] individual would have 
after ideal deliberation while thinking clearly with full pertinent information regarding those preferences’ (Rich-
ard Arneson, ‘Primary Goods Reconsidered’, Noûs 24 (1990), pp. 429–54, at p. 448). See also Michael Otsuka 
and Alex Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Prior-
ity View’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009), pp. 171–99, at pp. 172–73, n. 3. As Otsuka and Voorhoeve point 
out, note that endorsing this measure does not commit one to any particular view of what well-being is. 
     3 I am presupposing the moral significance of the contrast between the unity of the individual and the 
separateness of persons for this discussion. Some appear to disagree with this significance. For example, Iwao 
Hirose, ‘Aggregation and the Separateness of Persons’, Utilitas, 25 (2013), pp. 182–205, appears to find the sepa-
rateness of persons an unilluminating concept if it doesn’t rule out interpersonal aggregation and implausible if it 
does. In contrast with Hirose, I take it the value of the concept lies in that it rules out particular forms of utility-
maximizing calculus that would be appropriate within the bounds of an individual’s life. 
     4 See Andrew Williams, ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 315–31; Alex 
Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey, ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 381–
98; and Otsuka and Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters’, pp. 171–99. Note: I have modified the name of Williams’ 
view slightly to make it more informative. In his own paper, Williams uses the name ‘Restricted View’. I also use 
‘the Priority View’ and ‘prioritarianism’ interchangeably throughout.  
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My aim in this paper is to settle this dispute. I advance two main claims: First, I argue that, 
suitably modified, the competing claims view is more plausible than restricted prioritarianism. 
And second, I argue that insofar as the competing claims view escapes the force of the Level-
ling Down Objection, the onus is on the prioritarian defender to tell us why we should en-
dorse restricted prioritarianism in the first place.  
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I formulate the restricted- and competing claims 
view. In Section 3, I show that restricted prioritarianism is unable to capture some morally 
significant justifications of arrangements to the individuals involved. In Section 4, I argue 
that, while the Competing Claims View runs into the same problem as restricted prioritarian-
ism, unlike the latter, it is open to modification. I then consider two possible modifications: a 
new Claim Egalitarian View and a Modified Competing Claims View. I argue that the latter is the 
most plausible, because it a) correctly captures the cases that its counterparts cannot and b) 
avoids the Levelling Down Objection in a plausible manner. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Two Similar But Importantly Different Views 
In his essay ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, Andrew Williams develops an alternative 
version of prioritarianism. This version aims to justify the distribution of benefits and burdens 
to affected parties via the assessment of the strength of each individual’s claim to be helped.5 
On what we can call 
Restricted Prioritarianism, an individual has a claim to receive a benefit if and only if her 
well-being is at stake; the strength of her claim is determined by  
i)   her potential gain in well-being; and 
                                                
     5 ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, pp. 315–33. 
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ii)   the absolute level from which this gain takes place (with a claim to a given in-
crement in well-being being stronger, the lower the level from which this in-
crement takes place); but 
iii)   her claim is unaffected by how her level of well-being compares to others’ level 
of well-being.6 
Crucially, pioritarians claim that we have stronger reasons to benefit individuals the worse off 
they are in absolute terms, because each individual’s utility has diminishing marginal moral 
importance. In contradistinction to egalitarians, they claim that such reasons do not depend 
on the fact that individuals are worse off than others.7  
The scope of restricted prioritarianism is limited to interpersonal conflicts of interest. While 
Williams grants that in intrapersonal conflicts under risk individuals might have a claim that 
‘conflicts are resolved in a way that maximizes their expected utility, assuming individuals’ 
preferences and utility coincide’8, he believes that such claims could only arise on prudential 
and not moral grounds. So, in this sense the view is restricted, since its prioritarian weightings 
are only triggered in interpersonal conflicts. 
Williams provides a plausible interpretation for his view by drawing on the work of Thomas 
Nagel. As he points out, Nagel himself stresses the dissimilarity of conflicts within as opposed 
to across lives throughout his own writing. For example, in The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel ar-
gues that the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons each favour different 
principles in cases of intra- and interpersonal conflict resolution. In support of this, Nagel 
writes:  
                                                
     6 All of the claims-based views that I will be considering can also potentially accommodate different 
forms of aggregation. For this see Alex Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?’, Ethics 125 
(2014), pp. 64–87.  
     7 See Derek Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10 (1997), pp. 202–221, at pp. 212–15.  
     8 ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, p. 323. 
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when we are presented with several conflicting reasons stemming from the interests of another 
person, we must weigh them against one another by the same principles which it would be ra-
tional for that individual to employ in weighing the subjective reasons from which they origi-
nate […] It does not follow, however, that I can apply this same function to a collection of 
reasons stemming from both our interests, or from his interests and those of someone else. It 
appears in fact unlikely that the objective versions of even sophisticated intrapersonal combi-
natorial principles can be applied to interpersonal problems.9 
More generally, when he characterizes his own approach to distributive ethics, Nagel says 
quite explicitly that his view concerns ‘how to settle conflicts among the interests of different 
people’, and introduces pairwise comparisons as ‘the natural way to deal with conflicting 
claims’.10 In light of these remarks, Williams concludes that there is plausible support for the 
restricted reading of the priority view, which is thus not merely an ad hoc move. 
Restricted prioritarianism has a rival relational counterpart, which also lays claim to support 
from Nagel’s work. On what Fleurbaey, Otsuka and Voorhoeve call the 
Competing Claims View, an individual has a claim to receive a benefit if and only if her 
well-being is at stake; the strength of her claim is determined by  
i)   her potential gain in well-being; and 
ii)   her level of well-being relative to others with whom her interests conflict. 
Unlike restricted prioritarianism, the competing claims view is not only limited to interper-
sonal conflicts. Rather, it grounds the moral claims of individuals also on their prudential 
(welfare-based) interests. For example, as Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey write, in a pure in-
                                                
     9 See Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, 1970), p. 134. (Also quoted in ‘The Priority View 
Bites the Dust?’, p. 326.) 
     10 See Thomas Nagel, ‘Equality’, Mortal Questions (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 55–65, reprinted in The Ideal of 
Equality, ed. Clayton and Williams (Basingstoke, 2002); and Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York, 
1991), pp. 64–78.  
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trapersonal, one-person case under risk, this amounts to a claim ‘to be exposed to a sufficient-
ly attractive gamble’11—a gamble which maximizes the person’s expected well-being.  
More importantly for us, the competing claims view differs from restricted prioritarianism in 
a second respect. While restricted prioritarianism grounds the claims of individuals in part on 
their absolute levels of well-being, the competing claims view grounds them on the relative 
difference between individuals with claims. It is thus relational view.  
But unlike most egalitarian views, the competing claims view is of a Nagelian sort, which gives 
comparative advantage its due by appealing to the notion of justifiability to each affected par-
ty: 
How, one might ask rhetorically, can one justify providing a benefit of a given size to someone 
who is already better off in order to make him better off still, when one could instead provide 
an equally large benefit to someone else who is worse off, and who would not even reach the 
(unimproved) level of the better off person if she (the worse off person) is benefited?12 
So, both Williams as well as Otsuka, Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey draw on Nagel to justify the 
plausibility of their respective views. This might prompt us to ask which interpretation is cor-
rect. Although this question lies beyond what I intend to cover here, my tentative answer 
would probably be ‘both’. In his own writings on egalitarianism, Nagel never clearly distin-
guishes between non-relational and relational ways of giving priority to the worst off. This 
makes it difficult to decide which side he favours.  
Both views also correctly register the difference between the unity of the individual and the 
separateness of persons. They grant that an individual has a claim to have her potential bene-
fits and burdens balanced from the perspective of her interest in intrapersonal trade-off cases. 
                                                
     11 ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 397. 
     12 ‘Why It Matters’, pp. 183–84. 
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A morally motivated stranger who has to decide on behalf of that individual might then satis-
fy her claim provided that her expected potential benefit is sufficiently large to outweigh her 
expected burden—the important difference being that a defender of restricted prioritarianism 
would argue that these would be prudential and, unlike a proponent of the competing claims 
view, not moral reasons.13 
In interpersonal trade-off cases, in which individuals’ claims compete because they cannot be 
jointly met, both views agree on satisfying the strongest claim after considering how much 
individual stands to gain and either each individuals a) absolute level of well-being or b) well-
being relative to other individuals who also have a claim. It thus seems that insofar as both 
views are correctly sensitive to the difference between the unity of the individual and sepa-
rateness of person, they are equally plausible.  
The following sections attempt to change this picture. 
3.  A Problem for Restricted Prioritarianism? 
When trying to decide between two competing theories, we can say theory A is less plausible 
than theory B if A fails to capture morally significant facts while B does not, all other things 
being equal. In such a case, theory A lacks the explanatory power of theory B, which gives us 
reason to endorse B. The first part of my argument follows this dialectic. I here show that re-
stricted prioritarianism cannot capture some morally significant justifications of arrangements 
to the individuals involved. To illustrate this challenge, consider the following case:  
                                                
     13 There are two reasons for this: First, as we noted, according to restricted prioritarianism’s Nagelian ra-
tionale, it applies only to interpersonal conflicts. Second, if a proponent of restricted prioritarianism claimed that 
there could be prioritarian moral reasons to benefit absolutely worse off individuals in intrapersonal cases, then 
this would expose restricted prioritarianism to a separateness-of-persons-based objection. For this see Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve, ‘Why It Matters’, pp. 179–81; and Michael Otsuka, ‘Prioritarianism and the Separateness of 
Persons’, Utilitas 24 (2012), pp. 365–80. 
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Twin Trouble. Imagine you are a soon-to-be parent who will have either of two sets of 
twins. Either Anne and Betty or Chloe and Daisy will be born. Suppose that the exist-
ence of the two pairs is equally likely. You have just received bad news from your doc-
tor: your children are certain to develop different impairments in the case that they 
are born. If Anne and Betty are born, Anne will develop a moderate respiratory im-
pairment and Betty, being quite unlucky, will develop a very severe impairment. If 
Chloe and Daisy are born, Chloe will develop a moderate mobility impairment, com-
parable in severity to Anne’s, but Daisy will be fine. You need to change jobs and 
must therefore now decide whether you will move to the coast or the countryside. If 
you move to the coast, Anne could receive treatment in a special medical facility 
which would somewhat alleviate the effects of her disability. However, there would be 
no special facilities to treat Betty who suffers from a very rare and incurable impair-
ment. Neither would Chloe nor Daisy be able to benefit from the move to the coast. 
Alternatively, you could also move to the mountain region where Chloe would have 
access to a unique medical facility which would also somewhat alleviate the effects of 
her mobility impairment. But again, neither Daisy nor Anne and Betty would benefit 
from the move to the countryside. Suppose that the benefit to Anne by moving to the 
coast would be as great as the benefit to Chloe by moving to the countryside. How 
should you choose? 
Table 1 represents the above case. S1 and S2 are equiprobable states of the world. An empty 
cell represents non-existence. As noted before, to make a discussion of the prioritarian view 
possible I shall assume a cardinal, interpersonally comparable measure of utility (see n. 2) 
where a utility level of 0 corresponds to a quality of life barely worth living, while a utility lev-
el of 1.0 corresponds to full health. The utilities described correspond to the respective im-
pairments of the four twins. Lastly, I assume that none of them have claims based on desert or 
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prior entitlements, and that they enjoy their respective level of well-being through no choice 
or fault of their own. 
Table 1. Utilities for Twin Trouble. 
 State of the world (equiprobable) 
 S1 (50%) S2 (50%) 
Individuals Anne & Betty Chloe & Daisy Anne & Betty Chloe & Daisy 
Move to 
Coast 
0.7, 0.2   0.5, 1 
Move to 
Countryside 
0.5, 0.2   0.7, 1 
 
The set-up of the case relatively simple: we can either choose to move to the coast which im-
proves Anne’s quality of life in case she and Betty exist, or we can choose to move to the 
countryside which would equally improve Chloe’s quality of life in case she and Daisy exist. If 
we choose to move to the coast but S2 comes about, Chloe will not be able to receive the 
treatment for her disability, and vice versa for Anne if we choose the countryside but S1 obtains. 
Note that the levels of well-being of Anne and Chloe are the same if they each fail to receive a 
benefit and equal if they each receive a benefit, and hence their potential increments in utility 
improvement are also identical.  
S1 and S2 differ only in one important respect: in S2, Chloe and Daisy will exist and Daisy will 
have a higher level of well-being than Chloe; and in S1, Anne and Betty will exist and Betty 
will have a lower level of well-being than Anne. Given that S1 and S2 are equally likely to oc-
cur and Chloe would fare relatively worse than Daisy while Anne would fare relatively better 
than Betty, it seems correct that we should move to the countryside in order to help Chloe.  
How would Williams’ restricted view rule in this case? To answer this question, we first need 
to determine who of the four twins has a claim to on our assistance. Since claims can be made 
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only on behalf of ‘affected parties’14 or individuals who could benefit from our actions, there 
is no claim on behalf of Betty or Daisy. They remain unaffected by our actions. On the other 
hand, because Anne and Chloe could potentially from the move to the cost or the countryside 
and receive treatment for their disability, each of them has a claim. 
Now, since we must choose between moving either to the coast or the countryside but cannot 
choose both, Anne’s and Chloe’s claims are in competition with each other. This means that we 
have to assess the strength of their individual claims in order determine whose claim to satisfy.  
At this point, one might question whether claims of merely possible people have any moral 
weight. I believe it is plausible to assume that they do here, because Anne and Betty have a 
positive chance of existing that is independent of our actions and we, as their guardian, have to 
take action.15 As opposed to some so-called non-identity cases, our actions here do not affect 
the identities of the people who will come to exist. If it is certain that some individuals will exist 
independently and that, depending on how we act now, we would influence their level of 
their well-being in case they existed, then I believe we also ought to look after how they would 
fare.  
With this aside, now suppose that we move to countryside but S1 comes about. Knowing that 
she could have also received treatment for her disability, Anne would probably complain and 
ask why we did not choose to help her. We could then provide her with the following justifica-
tion for our decision:  
We had stronger reasons to move to the countryside, because, if Chloe had existed, 
she would have been worse off than Daisy even after having received the treatment for her disa-
                                                
     14 ‘The Priority View Bites the Dust?’, p. 322 and p. 324. 
     15 Note that it here also matters that Anne and Betty have an equal chance of existing. It matters because 
it affects how much weight one ought to assign to their claims. See also ‘Prioritarianism and the Separateness of 
Persons’, p. 372–73. 
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bility. In your case, you are now still better off than Betty. Since there was a 50:50 
chance that you or Chloe would exist, have the same level of well-being and face the 
same increment in well-being improvement, Chloe’s claim was strengthened by the 
fact that she would fare less well than Daisy. We therefore chose to move to the coun-
tryside. 
Restricted prioritarianism cannot give the above justification. Since it determines the strength 
of an individual’s claim by considering her absolute level of well-being, it is indifferent as to 
whether we choose to move to the coast or the countryside. On a cardinal interpersonal 
measure of well-being, which the prioritarian must presuppose, Anne’s and Chloe’s levels are 
identical in absolute terms, which means that they are equally badly off. It therefore follows 
on restricted prioritarianism that, ceteris paribus, their claims to receive the benefit must be 
equally strong. In this case, then, restricted prioritarianism cannot capture the conviction that 
we should help Chloe.  
I concede that a prioritarian defender might find the above hardly surprising. She could resist 
and argue as follows: The reason why restricted prioritarianism is unable to track our convic-
tion that we have stronger reason to choose to move to the countryside for Chloe is because it 
is a non-relational theory. It contrasts with a relational theory, which might determine the 
strength of a claim based on the level of well-being of an individual relative to other individuals. 
Our reason to help Chloe stems from our consideration of her fate in relation to Daisy’s which 
is much better than hers. It is therefore not surprising that restricted prioritarianism is insensi-
tive to this consideration.  
Nonetheless, this can hardly excuse the fact that restricted prioritarianism is indifferent about 
Twin Trouble. A diagnosis of a theory’s explanatory defect is no defence of that theory. In or-
der to stay true to her commitment to non-relationality, a prioritarian defender here either 
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has to tell us why our intuitions might be misplaced, or bite the bullet. In any case, this leaves 
her view unable to respond to the argument I have advanced here and therefore casts doubt 
on restricted prioritarianism’s plausibility. 
4.  Do the Twins Cause Less Trouble For the Competing Claims View? 
4.1.   On the Plausibility of a Claim Egalitarian View 
How does the competing claims view do in the Twin Trouble case?  
Although the competing claims view is a relational theory, it also struggles with Twin Trouble. 
Because it, like its prioritarian counterpart, assumes that an individual has a claim just in case 
she has her interest at stake, only Anne and Chloe have a claim on our assistance. And insofar 
as each of them stands to individually gain equal utility improvements through the treatment 
of their disability, their claims must be equally strong.  
What about their respective levels of well-being? As we have seen previously, according to 
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, only the inequality in well-being between individuals with conflict-
ing interests affects the strength of those individuals’ claims.16 To illustrate this, note that, for 
example, Betty and Daisy do not have conflicting interests, because they could not benefit from 
the move to the coast or the countryside. Neither option is in their interest, because neither 
option would improve their health-related level of well-being.  
By contrast, the situation changes when we consider Anne and Chloe. It is certainly in Anne’s 
interest that we choose to move to the coast, while it is in Betty’s that we choose to move to 
the countryside; their interests do conflict. This means that the hypothetical difference be-
tween only Anne and Chloe’s level of well-being is relevant in determining the strength of 
their claims.  
                                                
     16 ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 397. 
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However, there is no difference between the level of well-being from which the potential im-
provement to which they have a claim takes place. The competing claims view must therefore 
conclude that both have equally strong claims. This is surprising, since one would have 
thought that a view aiming to track relativities among individuals should be able to capture 
what is at stake here, unlike its non-relational competitor. 
The reason why the competing claims view struggles with Twin Trouble is that it is solely con-
cerned with the inequality between individuals whose interests conflict. Fleurbaey, Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve do not explain why only inequality of this kind should be relevant in deter-
mining the strength of an individual’s claim. I suspect the reason is that by limiting the ine-
quality to individuals with conflicting interests, they do not have to invoke the intrinsic bad-
ness of unfair inequality. But it is precisely this commitment that prevents the competing 
claims view from capturing Twin Trouble. 
As a consequence, we might therefore modify the competing claims view in the spirit of theo-
ries as developed by G.A Cohen and Larry Temkin, which are primarily concerned with un-
chosen and undeserved outcome inequality.17 Temkin argues for the moral significance of the 
fact that some people are worse off than others through no choice or fault of theirs:  
Equality is a subtopic of the more general […] topic of fairness. Specifically, concern about 
inequality is that portion of our concern about fairness that focuses on how people fare rela-
tive to others. […] We say that inequalities are objectionable because they are unfair; but by 
the same token, we say that there is a kind of unfairness in being worse off than another 
through no fault or choice of one’s own.18 
                                                
     17 See G. A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics (1989), pp. 906–44; and Larry S. 
Temkin, ‘Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and Comparative Notion’, Philosophical Issues 11 (2001), pp. 
327–53, and ‘Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection’, The Ideal of Equality, ed. Clayton and Wil-
liams (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 126–61.  
     18 ‘Inequality’, p. 334. 
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Given these remarks, perhaps the most obvious move is to extend the concern about compar-
ative fairness in contemporary relational egalitarian theories also to the competing claims 
view. On what we can then call the 
Claim Egalitarian View, the strength of an individual’s claim depends in part on her level 
of well-being relative to others who might be unfairly worse or better off than her. 
The view can now correctly rule that Chloe’s claim is stronger than Anne’s, because she is 
unfairly worse off than Daisy.  
Although this solves our problem, it comes at a certain cost. Derek Parfit has challenged egali-
tarian views that invoke the intrinsic badness of inequality and argued that such views are 
vulnerable to the LDO.19 His challenge has since then become perhaps ‘the most prevalent 
and powerful anti-egalitarian argument’.20 It has led some to ultimately abandon relational 
egalitarianism and to opt for prioritarian or other approaches that do not appeal to the intrin-
sic badness of equality.21  
The LDO’s force consists in the observation that a commitment to the intrinsic badness of 
inequality implausibly implies that it is at least in one respect better if we eliminate inequality 
by making some people worse off and no one better off. As Parfit poignantly puts it, this 
amounts to destroying ‘the eyes of the sighted, not to benefit the blind, but only to make the 
sighted blind’.22 But most people believe that there is nothing good about such a levelling down 
case. Accordingly, they conclude, a view which has this implausible implication, should be 
rejected. 
                                                
     19 ‘Equality and Priority’, pp. 210–14. 
     20 ‘Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection’, p. 126. 
     21 See Richard Arneson, ‘Egalitarianism and Responsibility’, The Journal of Ethics (1999), pp. 232–33. 
     22 ‘Equality and Priority’, p. 211. 
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It seems difficult to see how the claim egalitarian view could avoid this implication. Since its 
proponents believe that inequality is intrinsically bad and that its elimination gives us moral 
reason to satisfy one claim over another, it seems that they should also maintain that it is in 
one respect better if we made some people worse off and no one better off. 
In response, we might suggest that our moral reasons to make things more equal are triggered 
only when, and because, doing so meets an individual’s claim. Frances Kamm captures some-
thing reminiscent of this idea with her Principle of Contextual Interaction, according to which some 
properties might have no weight in some contexts, but still have weight in others.23 Another 
example can be found in Jonathan Dancy’s work, who proposes a distinction between so-
called favourers and enablers for different forms of relevance of relevant considerations.24 I quote: 
There is a general distinction between a feature that plays a certain role and a feature whose 
presence or absence is required for the first feature to play its role, but which does not play 
that role itself. The distinction between favouring and enabling is a special case of this general 
distinction.25 
If Dancy’s analysis is correct, then we might entertain the hypothesis that our moral reasons 
to act on inequality are triggered only in case we thereby promote an individual’s claim. The 
favourer of the elimination of unfair inequality accordingly requires the presence of an indi-
vidual’s claim as an enabler. If an individual’s claim is absent, our reasons to decrease inequali-
ty by levelling-down are consequently disabled.26 
There are other examples for normative reasons for action. I might promise my friend to do 
X, which speaks in favour of or gives me reason to do X. If this is the only relevant considera-
                                                
     23 See Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (Oxford, 2007), pp. 17–21, 
348–49, and p. 412. 
     24 See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford, 2004), chs. 2 and 3. 
     25 Ethics Without Principles, p. 45. 
     26 See also Andrew Mason, ‘Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection’, Analysis 61 (2001), pp. 
246–54, at p. 249. 
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tion in this context, then let us assume that I have all things considered reason to do X. But 
now suppose we find out that I was under severe duress while making the promise because 
someone else held a gun to my head. If I did not make the promise freely, then it is not the 
case anymore that I have overall reason to do X. The favourer of promising to do X requires 
the enabler of not having given the promise under duress. 
Although this line of thought seems promising, it is not entirely convincing. Consider a modi-
fied version of Twin Trouble. Imagine that you must make a decision between two different 
options. If you choose option one, then both Anne and Betty will exist with moderate im-
pairments. Alternatively, if you choose option two, then Charlie will exist with the very slight 
and Daisy with the very severe impairment. Suppose that regardless of which option you 
choose, the sum total of the well-being of the two people remains the same.  
It seems that in this case an egalitarian would choose option one, because it will result in an 
equal distribution of well-being between Anne and Betty which will contain no intrinsically 
bad inequality. Yet we here seem to have moral reasons to choose option one although there 
are no claims on behalf of anyone. This is because, unlike in Twin Trouble where each individ-
ual has an equal chance of existence independent of our actions, our actions here will cause 
the existence of the individuals in question.27 In light of this counterexample, I therefore be-
lieve that it is unlikely that our reasons to act on inequality require the presence of an individ-
ual’s claim as an enabler. 
                                                
     27 As this case also shows, the claims-based approach finds its limit in those non-identity cases, in which it 
is because of our actions that some individuals will exist as opposed to others. As Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve rightly 
note, if this problem cannot be overcome, then this means that the competing claims view can therefore only be 
‘one element’ in a complete theory of distributive justice; see ‘Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 
398; and Otsuka, ‘Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons’, p. 372, n. 17. 
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4.2.   Recasting the Competing Claims View 
There is a different, non-Temkinian way to modify the competing claims view that nonethe-
less allows it to capture Twin Trouble, remain invulnerable to the LDO, and keep its distinct-
ness as an approach. 
As we have seen previously, the claim egalitarian view, in line with Temkin, maintains that 
Chloe’s claim is stronger than Anne’s by appeal to the fact that she is unfairly worse off than 
Anne. It identifies such cosmically unfair inequalities as morally significant and thereby ex-
plains why they affect the strength of individuals’ claims. 
But a proponent of the competing claims view can accept that inequality matters, and (among 
other things) determines the strength of claims, without holding that this is because inequality 
is intrinsically bad.  
Recall that on the competing claims view, we have stronger reason to satisfy claim over an-
other simply by ‘virtue of the fact that it is, other things equal, harder to justify improving the 
situation of someone who is better off rather than someone who is worse off.’28 Such claims 
ground moral complaints on part of those individuals who are or would be worse off than oth-
ers. 
Otsuka and Voorhoeve can simply claim that the inequality between individuals with and 
without claims affects the strength of claims. As we saw earlier, in Twin Trouble, we can justify 
our decision to benefit Chloe to Anne in case she exists as follows: if Chloe existed, she would 
be worse off than Daisy even after having received the treatment for her disability. Yet in case we help 
Anne but Chloe existed, no such justification would be available. And the availability of this 
justification grounds a stronger moral complaint (and hence claim) on Chloe’s behalf. 
                                                
     28 ‘Why It Matters’, pp. 183–84, my emphasis. 
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More generally, the rhetorical question to illustrate the competing claims complaint thus be-
comes: how could one justify giving a benefit to someone who, if she existed, would be already 
better off than others, when we could instead provide an equally large benefit to someone else 
who, if she existed, would still be worse off than others? Accordingly, on this  
Modified Competing Claims View, the strength of individual’s claim depends in part on her 
level of well-being relative to everyone else who exists alongside her. 
But in contrast to the claim egalitarian view, the modified competing claims view does not 
maintain that it is because there is something intrinsically bad about the fact that some people 
are worse off than others through no choice or fault of theirs that an individual’s claim can be 
stronger. It is because the presence of such inequality grounds stronger moral complaints. 
To show that the competing claims complaint so conceived is in fact distinct from the egali-
tarian appeal to the intrinsic badness of unfair inequality, consider another modified version 
of Twin Trouble. Suppose that everything remains as in the original case except that this time 
none of the individuals involved have an independent chance of existing. Instead, imagine 
that you must choose between moving to the coast or the countryside and that this choice will 
make a difference to the identities of the individuals who will exist. If you choose to move to 
the coast, then Anne and Betty will exist and Anne will be able to receive the treatment for 
her moderate respiratory impairment. And if you choose to move to the countryside, then 
Chloe and Daisy will exist and Chloe will be able to receive the treatment for her respective 
impairment.  
Given this slight modification, the egalitarian complaint against choosing to move to the coast 
would be just as strong as in the original version of the Twin Trouble case. The complaint 
would be that this choice would even further increase cosmically unfair inequality between 
Anne and Betty. We therefore have reason to choose to move to the countryside which will 
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cause Chloe and Daisy to exist, thereby allowing Chloe to be benefitted. However, for the 
same reason that I gave in the previous subsection, we could not justify this choice by appeal 
to a competing claims complaint. There is no claim on behalf of Chloe because she does not 
have a claim to be brought into existence.  
As regards the possibility of levelling down, note that the modified competing claims view 
does not face the problem of its claim egalitarian counterpart. Even if the presence of worse 
or better off individuals who will remain unaffected by our choices can affect the strength of 
an individual’s claim (who will be affected), we still do not have even pro tanto moral reason to 
eliminate this inequality by making that individual worse off. Since the modified competing 
claims view is only triggered when an individual’s interests are at stake, the possibility of mak-
ing that individual worse off does not even arise. Hence this view does not invoke the intrinsic 
badness of inequality in the manner of an egalitarian such as Temkin. However, importantly, 
inequality still matters because it strengthens the claims of those who fare relatively worse off 
than others with and without claims. 
5.  Conclusion 
Let us take stock. We have seen that restricted prioritarianism fails to register our conviction 
that we should move to the countryside to help Chloe and, more generally, certain types of 
morally significant justifications of arrangements to the individuals involved. We have also 
seen that a prioritarian defender’s only option is to bite the bullet. Yet, this does not change 
the fact that restricted prioritarianism has to take a hit. On the other hand, we have seen that 
the modified competing claims view can correctly capture these types of justifications while 
providing a plausible explanation for why this does not commit us to levelling down (unlike 
the claim egalitarian view).  
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At this point, we might therefore not only question the explanatory plausibility of restricted 
prioritarianism but also the necessity to endorse it altogether. As noted, Parfit argues that part 
of the motivation behind the non-relational prioritarian approach as well as part of its appeal 
lie in its invulnerability to the LDO.29 But since the modified competing claims view escapes 
the LDO, we have no more reason to endorse restricted prioritarianism in the first place. It 
seems that the modified competing claims view indeed robs restricted prioritarianism in part 
of its raison d'être.  
The foregoing discussion thus suggests a two-fold problem for the defender of restricted prior-
itarianism. First, the onus is now on her to demonstrate the plausibility of her view since it 
lacks the explanatory power of its relational counterpart; and second, she owes us an addi-
tional reason to endorse the view apart from its invulnerability to the LDO. 
To conclude, I have attempted to the resolve the dispute between restricted prioritarianism 
and the competing claims view. I have argued that the modified competing claims view has 
greater plausibility than restricted prioritarianism and that it undermines part of the prioritar-
ian’s motivation to endorse restricted prioritarianism in the first place. For the prioritarian, 
the only way out of this is to bite the bullet. I therefore conclude that we have reason to reject 
restricted prioritarianism. 
  
                                                
     29 ‘Equality and Priority’, p. 214. 
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